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Abstract 
 
This paper describes optimal monetary policy in an economy with monopolistic competition, 
endogenous firm entry, a cash-in-advance constraint and pre-set wages. Firms must make profits in 
order to cover entry costs; thus a mark-up on goods prices is necessary. Without this mark-up, 
profits would be zero and no firm would enter the market, resulting in zero production. Therefore, 
the mark-up should not be removed. In this economy with market entrants, goods are more 
expensive than in a competitive economy with marginal cost pricing. This leads to a misallocation of 
resources, because leisure is not sold at a mark-up. Goods and leisure are two sources of utility 
that households trade off against each other. Thus, they may buy too much leisure instead of 
consumption goods. The consequence is that labour supply and production are sub-optimally low. 
Due to the labour requirement at market entry stage, insufficient labour supply also implies too little 
entry and too few firms in equilibrium. In the absence of fiscal instruments such as labour income 
subsidies, the optimal monetary policy under sticky wages achieves higher welfare than under 
flexible wages. The policy-maker uses the money supply instrument to raise the real wage - the cost 
of leisure - above its flexible-wage level, in response to expansionary shocks. This induces a rise in 
labour supply, more production of goods and more new firms. 
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 1 Introduction
The creation of new ￿rms and products, also referred to as extensive margin investment, prop-
agates and ampli￿es shocks. See Bergin and Corsetti (2008). This paper asks whether, in the
presence of nominal rigidities, stabilisation policy should be concerned with movements in the
number of ￿rms.
The analysis is based on a stylised business cycle model with ￿rm entry as the only form
of investment. There are three distortions: monopolistic competition, a cash-in-advance (CIA)
constraint and preset wages. Firms have monopoly power over the goods they produce. New
￿rms are established up to the point where monopoly pro￿ts just cover entry costs, which are
modelled as labour costs. In the presence of entry costs, the monopolistic markup provides an
incentive to enter the market and should not be removed. However, the absence of a markup on
leisure leads to a distortion and a misallocation of resources. The available (state-contingent)
policy instruments are lump sum taxes, the interest rate and the money supply. The policy
maker commits to state-contingent paths for the model variables which maximise welfare, taking
as given the optimal decisions of households and ￿rms. The main result is that optimal monetary
policy achieves higher welfare than the ￿ exible equilibrium. The reason is the misalignment of
markups between leisure and consumption goods that calls for subsidies to labour income or to
￿rm entry. Optimal monetary policy mimicks such subsidies by manipulating the real wage in
response to shocks.
The mechanism is as follows. An ine¢ ciently low real wage implies that hours are too low,
and therefore too little is produced at both the intensive margin (production of goods) and at
the extensive margin (production of ￿rms). As shown by Bilbiie et al (2008), e¢ ciency can
be restored through a labour income subsidy that aligns the markup on the price of leisure
with that on the price of consumption goods. Here, the required subsidy is higher than in
Bilbiie et al (2008), as a result of imperfectly competitive markups in both product and labour
markets. Both markups depress hours and production, such that leisure is suboptimally high
and consumption is suboptimally low.
In the absence of distortionary ￿scal instruments, the optimal monetary policy under sticky
wages does not replicate the ￿ exible allocation. Instead, the policy maker can use the money
supply instrument to bring the real wage closer to its e¢ cient level. A policy of raising the real
wage above its ￿ exible-wage level increases hours and expands production at the intensive and
extensive margin.
The money supply and the interest rate are separate instruments. The CIA restriction
on consumption purchases introduces a role for money. The optimality of the Friedman Rule
1- a standard result in CIA models - also applies here. Setting a higher interest rate taxes
consumption relative to leisure, thereby worsening the aforementioned allocative distortion.
In sticky-price models with endogenous ￿rm entry, Bergin and Corsetti (2008) and Bilbiie
et al (2007) ￿nd that it is optimal to fully stabilise goods prices, i.e. to replicate the ￿ exible-
price solution, while letting the number of ￿rms ￿ uctuate freely. In both studies, monetary
frictions are ignored and appropriate ￿scal policies ensure that the ￿ exible-price allocation is
e¢ cient. This paper instead considers monetary policy as a tool to stabilise ￿ uctuations around
a distorted steady state, i.e. in the absence of short-run ￿scal policy. This paper is more closely
related to Ade ao et al (2003), who consider optimal monetary policy in an economy with sticky
prices where ￿scal policy is restricted to lump sum taxation. They also ￿nd that the optimal
allocation under nominal rigidities and the ￿ exible allocation are not the same. However, entry
is absent and monopolistic markups are ine¢ cient in their model. Berentsen and Waller (2008)
analyse optimal monetary policy in a model with endogenous entry and a microfounded demand
for money. They ￿nd that the Friedman Rule is optimal if the entry cost is modelled as a ￿xed
cost.1
2 Model
The economy is initially in a state of nature denoted by s0. Thereafter, it is hit by a series of
stochastic i.i.d. shocks to government spending, entry costs and productivity. Every variable
determined at time t is indexed by the history of shocks that have occurred up to t, denoted
by st. Let St be the set of possible state histories. The probability of observing a particular
history is denoted by Pr
￿
st￿
.
2.1 Final Goods Sector
There is a mass N
￿
st￿
of di⁄erentiated intermediate goods, each produced by a monopolistically
competitive ￿rm. A ￿rm is indexed by f 2
￿
0;N
￿
st￿￿
. A ￿nal goods ￿rm bundles these
intermediate goods Y
￿
f;st￿
, taking as given their price P
￿
f;st￿
, and sells the output Y
￿
st￿
to
consumers and to the government at the competitive price P
￿
st￿
. The optimisation problem
of the ￿nal goods ￿rm is to choose the amount of inputs that maximise pro￿ts, i.e. it solves
max
Y (f;st)f2[0;N(st)]
(
P
￿
st￿
Y
￿
st￿
￿
Z N(st)
0
Y
￿
f;st￿
P
￿
f;st￿
df
)
1With an increasing entry cost due to a congestion externality in entry, deviations from the Friedman Rule
are needed to reduce ine¢ ciently high entry levels. Such congestion e⁄ects are beyond the scope of this paper.
2subject to the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) production function
Y
￿
st￿
=
 Z N(st)
0
Y
￿
f;st￿ ￿￿1
￿ df
! ￿
￿￿1
, ￿ > 1 (1)
The ￿rst order condition gives the following input demand function
Y
￿
f;st￿
=
 
P
￿
f;st￿
P (st)
!￿￿
Y
￿
st￿
(2)
Substituting the input demand in the production function yields the price index
P
￿
st￿
=
 Z N(st)
0
P
￿
f;st￿1￿￿ df
! 1
1￿￿
2.2 Intermediate Goods Sector
Intermediate ￿rms use labour Lc
￿
st￿
to produce di⁄erentiated goods. They set prices to max-
imise pro￿ts
P
￿
f;st￿
Y
￿
f;st￿
￿ W
￿
st￿
Lc
￿
st￿
subject to the demand function given by (2) and the production function
Y
￿
f;st￿
= Z
￿
st￿
Lc
￿
st￿
(3)
where Z
￿
st￿
is labour productivity and W
￿
st￿
is the wage rate. The optimal price is a constant2
markup over marginal cost
P
￿
f;st￿
=
￿
￿ ￿ 1
W
￿
st￿
Z (st)
Pro￿ts are a constant fraction of ￿rm revenue
D
￿
f;st￿
=
1
￿
P
￿
f;st￿
Y
￿
f;st￿
(4)
2.3 Firm Entry
Starting up a ￿rm requires labour services Lf
￿
st￿
. Let F
￿
st￿
denote the exogenous entry cost,
in the form of e⁄ective labour units Z
￿
st￿
Lf
￿
st￿
. In nominal terms, the entry cost is
W
￿
st￿
F
￿
st￿
Z (st)
Households ￿nance the entry costs incurred by new ￿rms in exchange for claims on those ￿rms￿
pro￿ts. At the end of each period, the entire stock of ￿rms depreciates.
2The markup may well be a (negative) function of the number of producers if goods become more substitutable
- the product space becomes more crowded - as more ￿rms enter the market. Then additional entry puts downward
pressure on the markup. Fluctuations in the number of ￿rms become more dampened as new entry limits itself
through its negative e⁄ect on markups. Although a possibly interesting extension, I leave the analysis of markup
endogeneity for future research, in order to keep the model as simple as possible. See Lewis (2009b), which takes
up this issue in a non-monetary model, focussing on optimal taxation.
32.4 Households
There exists a continuum of measure 1 of households. As in Erceg et al (2000), each household,
indexed by h 2 [0;1], supplies a di⁄erentiated labour type to a competitive labour packer, who
produces a labour bundle subject to the production function L
￿
st￿
=
￿
R 1
0 L
￿
h;st￿ ￿￿1
￿ dh
￿ ￿
￿￿1
,
￿ > 1, and sells it to intermediate ￿rms and to entrants at price W
￿
st￿
.3
Households choose paths for consumption, wages and asset holdings to maximise expected
lifetime utility
1 P
t=0
P
st
￿t Pr
￿
st￿￿
U
￿
C
￿
st￿￿
￿ V
￿
L
￿
st￿￿￿
subject to a sequence of budget constraints explained below, labour demand from the labour
packer L
￿
h;st￿
=
￿
W
￿
h;st￿
=W
￿
st￿￿￿￿ L
￿
st￿
, and the cash-in-advance constraint
P
￿
st￿
C
￿
st￿
￿ M
￿
st￿
(5)
U (￿) is strictly increasing and concave; V (￿) is strictly increasing and convex. At the start of
period t, households make a portfolio allocation decision in the asset market facing the constraint
W
￿
st￿
￿ M
￿
st￿
+ B
￿
st￿
+
X
st+1jst
Q
￿
st+1jst￿
A
￿
st;st+1￿
+
Z N(st)
0
S
￿
f;st￿ W
￿
st￿
F
￿
st￿
Z (st)
df ￿ X
￿
st￿
(6)
Total wealth is denoted by W
￿
st￿
. Households receive a monetary transfer X
￿
st￿
from the
government and buy four types of assets. Money holdings are denoted by M
￿
st￿
. B
￿
st￿
are one-period nominal risk-free bonds4 that have a price of one currency unit and a return
of R
￿
st￿
￿ 1, the gross interest rate, next period. A
￿
st;st+1￿
are nominal state-contingent
bonds5 that cost Q
￿
st+1jst￿
and pay a return of one currency unit in period t+1 if and only if
the economy is in the state of nature st+1. A share is denoted by S
￿
f;st￿
. Its price is a share
of the ￿rm entry cost and its payo⁄ is a share of the entrant￿ s monopoly pro￿ts earned at the
end of period t and paid out as dividends at the start of period t + 1.
After the closure of asset markets, production takes place and goods markets open. The
agents work and use money to make consumption purchases. At the end of the period, they
receive labour income and pay a lump sum tax T
￿
st￿
to the government. At the beginning of
3To simplify notation, I drop the h-subscript from here on.
4Risk-free bonds are needed in order to de￿ne the interest rate.
5I introduce state-contingent bonds in order to simplify the policy problem. Under complete ￿nancial markets
one can write the household budget constraint in present value form, which then becomes an implementability
constraint for the policy maker.
4period t + 1, the household has a stock of wealth given in nominal terms by
W
￿
st+1￿
= M
￿
st￿
+ R
￿
st￿
B
￿
st￿
+ A
￿
st;st+1￿
+
Z N(st)
0
S
￿
f;st￿
D
￿
f;st￿
df
+W
￿
st￿
L
￿
st￿
￿ P
￿
st￿
C
￿
st￿
￿ T
￿
st￿
Income from asset holdings is money carried over from the previous period, interest income
on bond holdings and dividends on share holdings. Initial household wealth is zero, such that
W
￿
s0￿
= 0.6 I rule out Ponzi schemes on asset holdings by assuming
lim
T!1
Q
￿
sTjs0￿
2
4B
￿
sT￿
+
X
sT+1jsT
Q
￿
sT+1jsT￿
A
￿
sT;sT+1￿
3
5 ￿ 0 (7)
The ￿rst order conditions for asset holdings imply
Q
￿
st+1jst￿
= ￿ Pr
￿
st+1jst￿ UC
￿
st+1￿
UC (st)
P
￿
st￿
P (st+1)
(8)
UC
￿
st￿
P (st)
= R
￿
st￿
￿
P
st+1jst
Pr
￿
st+1jst￿ UC
￿
st+1￿
P (st+1)
(9)
W
￿
st￿
F
￿
st￿
Z (st)
=
D
￿
f;st￿
R(st)
(10)
Equation (8) de￿nes the household￿ s stochastic discount factor, the marginal utility growth of
nominal wealth, given a particular state of nature in t+1. The period-zero value of consumption
in period t + 1 must obey Q
￿
st+1js0￿
= Q
￿
stjs0￿
Q
￿
st+1jst￿
. Combining (8) and (9) yields an
arbitrage condition between risk-free and state-contingent bonds
P
st+1jst Q
￿
st+1jst￿
= 1
R(st).
Equation (10) states that the cost of setting up a ￿rm must equal pro￿ts discounted by the
interest rate. Under ￿ exible wages, (11) equates the real wage to a markup over the marginal
rate of substitution between leisure and consumption, adjusted for the cost of holding money.
W
￿
st￿
P (st)
=
￿
￿ ￿ 1
VL
￿
st￿
UC (st)
R
￿
st￿
(11)
Under preset wages, the ￿rst order condition for wages is
W
￿
st￿
=
￿
￿ ￿ 1
P
stjst￿1 Pr
￿
stjst￿1￿
VL
￿
st￿
L
￿
st￿
P
stjst￿1 Pr(stjst￿1)
UC(st)
R(st)P(st)L(st)
(12)
Due to imperfect competition in the labour market, labour supply is reduced and leisure is
high relative to the competitive case. Imperfect competition in the goods market has a similar
e⁄ect: output and labour hours are lower than under perfect competition. Thus, leisure is sold
6This is consistent with the result in Chamley (1986) that only initial wealth should be taxed, and at a rate
of 100%.
5at a discount, while consumption goods are sold at a markup. The theory of optimal taxation
tells us that we want markups to be equal across all goods (consumption goods and leisure).
So, a markup or tax on leisure, equivalent to a labour subsidy, would be desirable.
There are two reasons for assuming sticky wages instead of sticky prices. First, Lewis
(2009a) shows that, in a model with endogenous entry, wage stickiness helps to reconcile the
model impulse responses of pro￿ts and entry to a monetary policy shock with those observed
in the data. The second reason is analytical convenience. Under price ￿ exibility, pro￿ts are a
constant fraction of revenue, which simpli￿es considerably the optimality condition for share
holdings and, as a result, the policy problem.
2.5 Government
The government ￿nances an exogenous stream of consumption purchases G
￿
st￿
with lump sum
taxes collected in the goods market. In addition, it makes a monetary transfer to the household
in the asset market ￿nanced by an expansion of the money stock Ms ￿
st￿
. Thus, the government
budget constraint is
P
￿
st￿
G
￿
st￿
+ X
￿
st￿
= T
￿
st￿
+ Ms ￿
st￿
￿ Ms ￿
st￿1￿
The law of motion for the money stock is Ms ￿
st￿
= Ms ￿
st￿1￿
+ X
￿
st￿
.
2.6 Market Clearing
Labour is used to produce consumption goods and to produce ￿rms.
L
￿
st￿
= N
￿
st￿￿
Lc
￿
st￿
+ Lf
￿
st￿￿
Using the respective production functions, labour market clearing requires
Z
￿
st￿
L
￿
st￿
= N
￿
st￿￿
Y
￿
f;st￿
+ F
￿
st￿￿
(13)
The market clearing conditions for ￿nal goods, for the two types of bonds, for shares and for
money are, respectively,
Y
￿
st￿
= C
￿
st￿
+ G
￿
st￿
(14)
B
￿
st￿
= A
￿
st;st+1￿
= 0
S
￿
f;st￿
= 1 (15)
M
￿
st￿
= Ms ￿
st￿
(16)
An imperfectly competitive equilibrium is set of prices, allocations and policies, such that ￿rst,
the optimality conditions of the ￿nal goods ￿rm, the intermediate goods ￿rms, the labour packer
and the household are satis￿ed; second, all markets clear.
62.7 Returns to Product Diversity and Marginal Rate of Transformation
Under endogenous ￿rm entry, the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator (1) exhibits increasing returns to
variety. This has implications for how, in the aggregate, inputs are converted into ￿nal output.
To understand the First Best e¢ ciency conditions presented in the next section, I now derive
the marginal rate of transformation (MRT) for this economy.
The symmetry of the intermediate ￿rms￿output levels implies that the production function
of the ￿nal goods ￿rm reduces to
Y
￿
st￿
= N
￿
st￿1+ 1
￿￿1 Y
￿
f;st￿
(17)
From (17) we see that 1+ 1
￿￿1 represents the degree of returns to product diversity. If 1+ 1
￿￿1 >
1 , ￿ > 1, there are increasing returns to variety. As ￿ ! 1, i.e. as the elasticity of substitution
between inputs into ￿nal good production increases, the degree of increasing returns to variety
diminishes. See also Kim (2004). The symmetry of the intermediate goods prices implies that
the aggregate price index is
P
￿
st￿
= P
￿
f;st￿
N
￿
st￿￿ 1
￿￿1 (18)
Because of increasing returns to product diversity, the price index is decreasing in the number
of di⁄erentied goods. As the number of goods rises, it becomes less costly to produce the same
amount of ￿nal output. Next, I derive an aggregate production function for this economy by
combining the production function of the ￿nal goods ￿rm (17) with the production function of
the intermediate goods ￿rms (3)
Y
￿
st￿
= N
￿
st￿ 1
￿￿1 Z
￿
st￿
LC
￿
st￿
(19)
where LC
￿
st￿
= N
￿
st￿
Lc
￿
st￿
is total labour used in the production of goods. Di⁄erentiating
(19) with respect to labour, we have
@Y
￿
st￿
@LC (st)
= N
￿
st￿ 1
￿￿1 Z
￿
st￿
One additional labour unit is transformed into N
￿
st￿ 1
￿￿1 Z
￿
st￿
units of the ￿nal good. Replac-
ing total consumption output with C
￿
st￿
+G
￿
st￿
using the market clearing condition for ￿nal
goods (14), we can derive MRT of labour into private consumption as
@C
￿
st￿
@LC (st)
=
N
￿
st￿ 1
￿￿1 Z
￿
st￿
1 + ￿(st)
(20)
where we have introduced the variable ￿
￿
st￿
= G
￿
st￿
=C
￿
st￿
.
In the standard model with an exogenous level of government consumption and a constant
number of ￿rms, the MRT is simply equal to productivity Z
￿
st￿
. Then the social and private
7marginal rates of substitution are the same. Here, due to the multiplicative nature of the
government spending shock, ￿
￿
st￿
is like a negative productivity shock and enters the MRT,
too. In a model without entry, Teles (2009) shows that if ￿
￿
st￿
is exogenous, the First Best can
only be implemented if the government can use proportionate taxes. More importantly though,
the social MRT contains the endogenous term N
￿
st￿ 1
￿￿1 relating to the increasing returns to
product diversity. Raising the number of ￿rms by one unit gives rise to a positive externality
on total output.
We can rewrite the aggregate production function (19) to express the economy-wide e⁄ective
labour requirement as
Z
￿
st￿
LC
￿
st￿
= N
￿
st￿￿ 1
￿￿1 C
￿
st￿￿
1 + ￿
￿
st￿￿
The reduction in the labour requirement from increasing the number of ￿rms is then obtained
by di⁄erentiating this expression with respect to N
￿
st￿
,
@Z
￿
st￿
LC
￿
st￿
@N (st)
= ￿
1
￿ ￿ 1
N
￿
st￿￿ 1
￿￿1￿1 C
￿
st￿￿
1 + ￿
￿
st￿￿
(21)
3 First Best Equilibrium
The First Best equilibrium is de￿ned as the equilibrium reached by a benevolent social planner
who maximises the utility of the representative household subject to the resource constraint.
Functional forms of utility and technology are taken as given. It is a useful benchmark with
which one can compare any constrained-e¢ cient allocation. The First Best problem is as follows
max
f(C(st);L(st);N(st))st2Stg
1
t=0
1 X
t=0
X
st
￿t Pr
￿
st￿￿
U
￿
C
￿
st￿￿
￿ V
￿
L
￿
st￿￿￿
subject to the resource constraint (25) derived below. The First Best allocation satis￿es
VL
￿
st￿
UC (st)
=
N
￿
st￿ 1
￿￿1 Z
￿
st￿
1 + ￿(st)
(22)
F
￿
st￿
=
1
￿ ￿ 1
N
￿
st￿￿ 1
￿￿1￿1 C
￿
st￿￿
1 + ￿
￿
st￿￿
(23)
Equation (22) is an intrasectoral e¢ ciency condition. It states that the marginal rate of substi-
tution between labour and consumption, MRS
￿
st￿
= VL
￿
st￿
=UC
￿
st￿
, must equal the marginal
rate of transformation of labour into (private) consumption. See (20). Equation (23) is an in-
tersectoral e¢ ciency condition. It states that the cost (in e⁄ective labour units) of producing
one additional ￿rm, F
￿
st￿
, must equal the reduction in the number of e⁄ective labour units
required in the production of goods, i.e. the e¢ ciency gain, brought about by this extra ￿rm.
See (21). Notice that the parameter ￿ appears in the First Best solution due to the assumption
8of increasing returns to product diversity captured by 1
￿￿1. Let￿ s de￿ne two wedges, an intra-
sectoral wedge and an intersectoral wedge. The intrasectoral wedge is the ratio of MRS
￿
st￿
to
MRT
￿
st￿
, minus 1. The intersectoral wedge ISW
￿
st￿
is de￿ned as
ISW
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In the First Best equilibrium,
MRS(st)
MRT(st) ￿ 1 = 0 and ISW
￿
st￿
= 0.
Assuming log consumption utility and linear labour disutility, such that UC
￿
st￿
= C
￿
st￿￿1
and VL
￿
st￿
= 1, equation (22) becomes
1 =
N
￿
st￿￿ 1
￿￿1 C
￿
st￿￿
1 + ￿
￿
st￿￿
Z (st)
Thus, labour employed in goods production is constant and equal to 1. We can write this
equilibrium recursively as follows
NFB ￿
st￿
=
1
￿ ￿ 1
Z
￿
st￿
F (st)
CFB ￿
st￿
=
NFB ￿
st￿ 1
￿￿1 Z
￿
st￿
1 + ￿(st)
LFB ￿
st￿
=
￿
￿ ￿ 1
The number of ￿rms is proportional to productivity and inversely proportional to the entry
cost. Expressing consumption as a function of exogenous variables only, we have C
￿
st￿
=
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)F
￿
st￿￿￿ 1
￿￿1 ￿
1 + ￿
￿
st￿￿￿1 Z
￿
st￿ ￿
￿￿1. Thus, consumption is increasing in productivity,
with elasticity ￿
￿￿1. It is decreasing in the entry cost, with elasticity ￿ 1
￿￿1 and in government
spending, with elasticity ￿1. Labour is constant7 at ￿
￿￿1.
4 Optimal Policy
This section derives the optimal policy following the approach in Ade ao et al (2003). First,
I collapse all equilibrium conditions into a single equation - the implementability condition -
that, together with the resource constraint, restricts the set of implementable allocations for any
given policy sequences. Second, I show that under both ￿ exible and sticky wages, the optimal
interest rate policy is to follow the Friedman Rule. Third, I characterise the optimal allocations
under this policy by deriving the optimal intersectoral and intrasectoral wedges under ￿ exible
wages and under sticky wages. I show that the ￿ exible-wage optimal allocation coincides with
the sticky-wage optimal allocation only if labour supply is inelastic.
7Note, however, that labour is constant only in the log utility case.
94.1 Imperfectly Competitive Equilibrium: Compact Form
More compactly, we can de￿ne a (symmetric) equilibrium as a set of prices
n￿
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st￿
;P
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f;st￿
;Q
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st+1jst￿
;Q
￿
st+1js0￿
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allocations
n￿
C
￿
st￿
;N
￿
st￿
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￿
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st2St
o1
t=0
and policies
n￿
T
￿
st￿
;Ms ￿
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st2St
o1
t=0
such that:
1. the household present-value budget constraint is satis￿ed,
0 ￿
1 P
t=0
P
st
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(24)
+
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P
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2. the resource constraint is satis￿ed8,
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st￿
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(25)
3. the following equilibrium conditions are satis￿ed
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as well as
W
￿
st￿
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=
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UC (st)
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under ￿ exible wages or
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under sticky wages.
8If the resource constraint and the household budget constraint are satis￿ed, the government budget constraint
is satis￿ed by Walras￿Law.
10The resource constraint (25) is derived by substituting the ￿nal goods production function
under symmetry (17) in the labour market clearing condition (13). Under the assumption of
complete contingent claims markets, one can write the consumer budget constraint in present
value form. First, weight each equation (6) by the period-0 value of wealth in state st, Q
￿
stjs0￿
.
Second, sum the resulting equations across states and dates, using the no-Ponzi game condition
(7). Doing so eliminates bond holdings from the budget constraint. Finally, substitute the
cash-in-advance constraint (5), holding with equality, to eliminate money holdings. Using (4),
(18), (17) and (14), ￿rm pro￿ts can be expressed as a fraction of total consumption expenditure
divided by the number of active ￿rms:
D
￿
f;st￿
=
1
￿
P
￿
st￿
C
￿
st￿￿
1 + ￿
￿
st￿￿
N (st)
(27)
We derive (24) using the market clearing condition for shares (15) and the expression for ￿rm
pro￿ts (27). Substituting (27) in the ￿rst order condition for shares yields the free entry condi-
tion (26).
Notice that, di⁄erent from "cashless economy" models, money is not determined residually
here. Instead, due to the cash in advance restriction, it can be used as a separate policy
instrument, in addition to the interest rate.
4.2 Implementability Condition and Planner Problem
The objective of the Ramsey planner is to choose the model variables so as to maximise the
utility of the respresentative household, taking as given the optimality conditions of the house-
holds and the ￿rms, as well as market clearing. The constraints of the planner problem are all
the equilibrium conditions given in the previous subsection. The idea of an implementability
condition is that not all of these constraints are restrictive for the planner. By substituting
out certain variables (in particular, the prices), the constraints can be condensed in only one
equation in addition to the resource constraint. The planner then chooses the allocations that
maximise utility, given this implementability condition and the resource constraint.
The planner is free to set a path for lump-sum taxes T
￿
st￿
to satisfy (24), while the variables
P
￿
f;st￿
, Q
￿
st+1js0￿
, Q
￿
st+1jst￿
, P
￿
st￿
and M
￿
st￿
adjust to satisfy the ￿rst ￿ve equilibrium
conditions under 3. The remaining equilibrium conditions restricting the planner problem are
the resource constraint (25), the free entry condition (26) and the relevant wage setting equation:
(11) under ￿ exible wages or (12) under sticky wages.
Under ￿exible wages, the set of implementable allocations for
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is restricted by the implementability condition (IC)
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11and the resource constraint (25) for any path of the interest rate R
￿
st￿
. Equation (28) is
derived by combining the free entry condition (26) with the wage setting equation (11) to
eliminate W
￿
st￿
.
Under sticky wages, the wage setting condition is given by (12). Solving the free entry
condition for the price level and substituting the result in the wage setting equation to eliminate
P
￿
st￿
gives
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Note that we have cancelled W
￿
st￿
, which is known in t￿1. Rearranging and using the law of
iterated expectations yields the implementability condition under sticky wages
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)
= 0 (29)
The constraints of the policy problem are the implementability constraint (29) and the resource
constraint (25). Because the IC under sticky wages is the expected value of the IC under ￿ exible
wages, and the resource constraint is binding in both cases, it follows that the Optimal Policy
allocation under ￿ exible wages is contained in the set of implementable allocations under sticky
wages. Whether this allocation is optimal under sticky wages is analysed below.
Let ￿t’
￿
st￿1￿
Pr
￿
st￿
be the Lagrange multiplier on (29). Then the planner problem under
sticky wages is as follows
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where the Lagrangian is
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with ’
￿
s￿1￿
= 0. Under ￿ exible wages, ’
￿
st￿1￿
is replaced with ’
￿
st￿
.
Following Ade ao et al (2003), I ￿rst derive the optimal interest rate policy before solving for
the optimal allocations under this policy. It is straightforward to show that the Friedman Rule
is optimal irrespective of nominal rigidities. This method di⁄ers from the Ramsey approach to
optimal policy of ￿rst solving the primal problem for the optimal allocations and then backing
out the policies that support these allocations.
124.3 Optimal Interest Rate Policy
The interest rate policy problem under sticky wages is to choose a path for the interest rate
f
￿
R
￿
st￿
￿ 1
￿
st2Stg1
t=0 to maximise L. The ￿rst derivative of the Lagrangian is
@L
@R(st)
= ￿￿t Pr
￿
st￿
’
￿
st￿1￿ Z
￿
st￿
UC
￿
st￿
C
￿
st￿￿
1 + ￿
￿
st￿￿
￿F (st)R(st)
3 N (st)
L
￿
st￿
We have @L
@R(st) < 0. Welfare, as summarised by L, decreases as the interest rate increases. It
follows that R
￿
st￿
should be as low as possible. Given the lower bound of unity on the gross
interest rate, this implies that the Friedman Rule, R
￿
st￿
= 1, is optimal.
As can be seen from (11), the money distortion a⁄ects the intratemporal consumption-
leisure tradeo⁄ decision. It drives a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and labour and the real wage. The higher the interest rate, the greater is this
wedge. The optimality of the Friedman Rule is a standard result in the literature following
Ireland (1996) and is shown to hold under more general conditions in Correia et al (2008).
Notice that under the Friedman Rule, the cash-in-advance constraint is no longer binding and
hence the level of real money holdings is indeterminate. To avoid this indeterminacy, we consider
equilibria in which the interest rate approaches 1.
4.4 Optimal Allocations under the Friedman Rule
Under the Friedman Rule, the planner problem is written as before, with R
￿
st￿
set equal to 1
in L. Again, under ￿ exible wages, ’
￿
st￿1￿
is replaced with ’
￿
st￿
.
4.4.1 Flexible Wages
The ￿rst order conditions for the policy problem under ￿ exible wages imply
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Assuming log consumption utility and linear labour disutility, ￿f
￿
st￿
= 1 and the Optimal
Policy equilibrium can be written recursively as follows.
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13Under ￿ exible wages, the Friedman Rule is optimal and implements the unique allocation given
by (32) to (34). The optimal allocation is una⁄ected by the money supply policy. The size of
the money stock a⁄ects only (and pins down) the nominal variables P
￿
st￿
, P
￿
f;st￿
, W
￿
st￿
and D
￿
f;st￿
. This is the nominal indeterminacy under ￿ exible wages as explained in Ade ao et
al (2003).
The number of ￿rms moves one-to-one with productivity and with government spending.
It is a negative function of the wage markup
￿
￿￿1, the elasticity of substitution between goods
￿ and the entry cost. A higher product market distortion (a lower price elasticity of demand
for goods ￿) increases the ￿rms￿pro￿t share 1
￿ and therefore creates an incentive to enter the
market. Labour is increasing in government spending. It is decreasing in the wage markup
￿
￿￿1,
in the elasticity of substitution ￿. Writing consumption in terms of exogenous variables we have
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Consumption is decreasing in the entry cost, with elasticity ￿ 1
￿￿1, and in government spending,
with elasticity 2￿￿
￿￿1, which is negative if we assume ￿ > 2: It is increasing in productivity,
with elasticity ￿
￿￿1. Given the cash-in-advance constraint, real money balances are equal to
consumption. From (11), we see that the real wage also equals consumption.
The impulse responses of the number of ￿rms, consumption and labour to a productivity
shock and to an entry cost shock in the First Best allocation are identical to those in the
Optimal Policy allocation under ￿ exible wages; the di⁄erence lies purely in the steady states.
The government spending shock, however, does induce di⁄erent responses. In the First Best
allocation it reduces consumption one-for-one and leaves the number of ￿rms and labour hours
unchanged. In the Optimal Policy allocation, the number of ￿rms and labour rise one-for-one
with government spending, while consumption decreases by 2￿￿
￿￿1.
In the absence of government spending, i.e. if ￿
￿
st￿
= 0, the wedge between the Optimal
Policy equilibrium and the First Best is constant equals the joint markup ￿
￿￿1
￿
￿￿1. Note that
the wage markup has a similar e⁄ect as the goods markup: it makes leisure cheaper relative to
consumption.
With government spending, the wedge between the First Best and the Optimal Policy allo-
cation depends positively on ￿
￿
st￿
. From (33) we see that private consumption is crowded out
by government spending.
144.4.2 Sticky Wages
The ￿rst order conditions of the policy problem under sticky wages imply the optimal wedges
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Under sticky wages, the Friedman Rule is again optimal. At the Friedman Rule, there are
multiple implementable allocations associated with di⁄erent money supplies, which all satisfy
the implementability condition. Within the set implementable allocations, the policy maker
picks the optimal one, which in general does not coincide with the ￿ exible-wage allocation.
Comparing these sticky-wage optimal wedges with the ￿ exible-wage optimal wedges (30) and
(31), we see that only if L
￿
st￿
= 1 does the ￿ exible-wage allocation satisfy the ￿rst order
conditions of the sticky-wage equilibrium. This is the case of inelastic labour supply studied by
Bilbiie et al (2008). Then ￿f
￿
st￿
= ￿s
￿
st￿
and the optimal wedges coincide.
Under log consumption utility and linear labour disutility, the Optimal Policy equilibrium
under sticky wages satis￿es
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together with the resource constraint (25) and the implementability constraint
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.
For the sticky-wage case, I linearise the model and derive the impulse responses to shocks
numerically under the following calibration (see Table 1).9
[ insert Table 1 here ]
9A closed-form solution does not exist even for the two-period two-state case, which is a non-linear system
of seven equations in seven unknowns.
15Table 2 shows the elasticities in the shock period of the number of ￿rms, consumption and
labour to shocks to productivity, entry costs and government spending. It compares the impulse
responses of the First Best (FB) allocation to the Optimal Policy allocation under ￿ exible wages
(O￿ ex) and under sticky wages (Os).
[ insert Table 2 here ]
Under sticky wages, the number of ￿rms, consumption and labour increase more in response
to a productivity shock than under ￿ exible wages. In particular, the expansion in labour under
sticky wages allows for a larger increase in the production of both ￿rms and goods.
A decrease in the entry cost induces the optimal policy under sticky wages to raise labour
somewhat, such that the number of ￿rms increases more than one-for-one and consumption also
increases more than under ￿ exible wages.
The Optimal Policy responses to a government spending shock under sticky wages are fairly
close to the First Best responses, with consumption falling by around 1 and the number of ￿rms
and labour falling only very slightly. Thus, shocks to government spending result in a reduction
in output along the intensive margin rather than an expansion of hours and product diversity
as in the ￿ exible-wage model.
The policy maker exploits the degree of freedom given by the wage rigidity to address the
undersupply of labour and the underproduction of goods and ￿rms. As labour rises beyond its
steady state level, both consumption and the number of ￿rms expand more than in the ￿ exible-
wage allocation. The impulse responses of the real wage to the shocks are identical to those
of consumption. The real wage increases more and thus leisure becomes more expensive in the
sticky-wage allocation than in the ￿ exible-wage allocation. The wage rigidity, combined with
the money supply instrument, allows the policy maker to manipulate the real wage in the face
of shocks, a⁄ecting directly the consumption-leisure tradeo⁄ decision. Optimal policy chooses a
di⁄erent allocation than the ￿ exible-wage allocation by introducing a markup on leisure that is
absent under ￿ exible wages. Monetary policy can mimick the e⁄ect of a labour supply subsidy,
which has the same e⁄ect to make leisure more expensive relative to consumption.
The assumption of a labour requirement for ￿rm startups is important for the results of this
paper. Since the wage rate is part of the entry cost, wage stickiness a⁄ects the entry decision
and it is through this e⁄ect that monetary policy can in￿ uence the investment margin. In the
Appendix, I show a variant of the model in which entry costs are speci￿ed in terms of ￿nal
output. In that model, wage stickiness does not alter the set of implementable allocations that
the policy maker faces. This is because wages are not part of entry costs and any wage setting
restriction therefore does not distort the entry decision. Therefore, the optimal allocation is the
16same under sticky wages as under ￿ exible wages. Lewis (2009a) compares impulse responses to
a monetary policy shock to their empirical counterparts, for di⁄erent variants of the endogenous
entry model. Qualitatively, the best-performing model is one in which entry costs are in labour
units, rather than in terms of ￿nal output, and wages are sticky. This evidence leads me to
prefer the benchmark model to the modi￿ed version.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the implications of ￿rm entry for optimal stabilisation policy. The
economy has three distortions: product and labour markets are imperfectly competitive, wages
are set in advance, consumption purchases must be made with money. The cash-in-advance
restriction is undone via the Friedman Rule, which aligns the returns on bonds and money.
The markup in the goods market is e¢ cient, because pro￿ts are needed to cover the entry
cost. However, the absence of a markup on leisure implies that leisure is too cheap relative
to consumption goods. Therefore, labour is suboptimally low. Due to the labour requirement
for producing new ￿rms, this has a negative e⁄ect on entry rates. Even though implementing
the ￿ exible allocation, i.e. removing the sticky wage distortion, is feasible, it is not welfare-
maximising. In response to expansionary shocks, the optimal policy implies a larger increase in
hours, more consumption and higher entry than is observed in the ￿ exible economy. The wage
rigidity, combined with the money supply instrument, provides the policy maker with a tool to
increase the real wage, moving it closer to its e¢ cient level, in response to such shocks. As a
result, more labour is employed at both margins: at the intensive margin (production of goods)
and at the extensive margin (production of ￿rms).
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Table 1: Calibration
￿ 3:8 elasticity of substitution (goods)
￿ 10 elasticity of substitution (labour)
F 0:02 steady state entry cost
￿ 1 + 1=3 steady state government spending
Z 1 steady state productivity
Table 2: Impulse Responses
Z (st) ￿F (st) 1 + ￿(st)
FB O￿ ex Os FB O￿ ex Os FB O￿ ex Os
N (st) 1 1 4:832 1 1 1:531 0 1 ￿0:088
C (st) 1:357 1:357 3:832 0:357 0:357 0:531 ￿1 ￿0:6429 ￿1:088
L(st) 0 0 2:28 0 0 0:121 0 1 ￿0:063
Note: The ￿gures show short-run elasticities. FB stands for First Best allocation, O￿ ex
for Optimal Policy allocation under ￿ exible wages and Os for Optimal Policy allocation
under sticky wages.
19Appendix: Entry Cost in Terms of Final Output
I now assume that the exogenous entry cost is given in terms of ￿nal output instead of e⁄ective
labour units as in the benchmark model. The new entry cost is denoted by Ffo
￿
st￿
. The
household budget constraint becomes
W
￿
st￿
￿ M
￿
st￿
+ B
￿
st￿
+
X
st+1jst
Q
￿
st+1jst￿
A
￿
st;st+1￿
+
Z N(st)
0
S
￿
f;st￿
P
￿
st￿
Ffo
￿
st￿
df ￿ X
￿
st￿
The ￿rst order condition for shares becomes P
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The government budget constraint reads
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The ￿nal goods market clearing condition becomes
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Total output comprises consumption purchases and entry costs. Combining the symmetric
￿nal goods production function Y
￿
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we have the economy￿ s aggregate production
function,
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Di⁄erentiating (37) with respect to N
￿
st￿
, we can derive the marginal product, in terms of ￿nal
output, of one additional ￿rm,
@Y
￿
st￿
@N (st)
=
1
￿ ￿ 1
N
￿
st￿ 1
￿￿1￿1 Z
￿
st￿
L
￿
st￿
(38)
Combining equations (36) and (37) yields the aggregate resource constraint
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The remaining equilibrium conditions are as in the benchmark model.
20First Best Equilibrium
The First Best problem is as follows
max
f(C(st);L(st);N(st))st2Stg
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subject to the resource constraint (39). The ￿rst order conditions satisfy
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The intrasectoral e¢ ciency condition (40) is the same as in the benchmark model: the marginal
rate of substitution between labour and consumption must equal the marginal rate of trans-
formation of labour into private consumption. Neither the MRS nor the MRT depends on the
speci￿cation of the entry cost. The intersectoral e¢ ciency condition (41) is, however, di⁄erent
from the benchmark. It states that the cost (in terms of consumption units) of setting up an
additional ￿rm, Ffo
￿
st￿
, must equal the gain in consumption output that the extra ￿rm gives
rise to, i.e. the marginal product of a ￿rm (38). Under log consumption utility and linear labour
disutility, we can derive the recursive system
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Labour is constant in the First Best equilibrium, a consequence of the log utility assumption.
Note that labour is unambiguously higher here than in the benchmark model:
LFB
fo
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=
￿ ￿ 1
￿ ￿ 2
>
￿
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= LFB ￿
st￿
When entry costs are speci￿ed in units of consumption, the number of ￿rms in the First Best
responds more to productivity shocks and to entry cost shocks than in the benchmark model.
The elasticities are ￿￿1
￿￿2 and ￿￿￿1
￿￿2, which is greater (in absolute terms) than 1 and -1, respec-
tively. In steady state, the number of ￿rms and consumption are higher than in the benchmark
model.
Implementability Condition and Planner Problem
The set of implementable allocations for
n￿
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is restricted by the
free entry condition (35) and the resource constraint (39) for any path of the interest rate
R
￿
st￿
￿ 1.
21Notice that here, the wage setting scheme does not matter for the optimal allocations. I.e. if
there is wage stickiness, this does not restrict the set of implementable allocations for the policy
maker. This is because the wage rate no longer enters the free entry condition and therefore
does not a⁄ect the investment margin. Since wage stickiness does not matter, monetary policy
cannot be used to select allocations. The absence of a labour requirement to set up a ￿rm
removes the potency of monetary policy instrument under sticky wages to a⁄ect the investment
margin. Lump sum taxes must adjust to satisfy the household budget constraint, the money
stock must adjust to satisfy the cash-in-advance constraint.
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be the Lagrange multiplier on the free entry condition. The planner
problem is as follows
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Optimal Interest Rate Policy
The interest rate policy problem is to choose a path for the interest rate f
￿
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to maximise Lfo. The ￿rst order condition is
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Because this expression is negative, the Friedman Rule is optimal.
Optimal Allocations under the Friedman Rule
Under the Friedman Rule, we can derive and rearrange the ￿rst order conditions of the Optimal
Policy problem to express the equilibrium as follows
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Labour is constant and equal to its First Best level. The number of ￿rms in the Optimal Policy
equilibrium is smaller than in the First Best.
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